Putin's War on Ukraine
September 11th 2023
This commentary explores how the prevailing storylines throughout this conflict have been evolving since the invasion began on February 24, 2022. Here's a look at several of these distinct phases:
First, from the early days, the narrative appeared to be around the idea that a Russian victory was inevitable within days/weeks.
Second, months in, and the realization that the plucky Ukrainian defenders could resist for some time but were still ultimately vulnerable/doomed to defeat as Putin went through the gears and was prepared to cross red lines (Weapons of Mass Destruction - WMDs). The idea was still that he wanted Ukraine more than the West and was prepared to win the escalation battle.
Third, to a realization, or relief, that Putin had limits and was not prepared to use means that ultimately would get him into a direct fight with NATO or annoy the Chinese, with WMD, etc. The realization was that Putin had limits and that the West could push him by going through the gears of supplying ever more sophisticated military weapons without the risk of escalation to NATO.
Fourth, the period last autumn when Ukraine achieved major counteroffensive victories in Khakhiv and Kherson and the realization then that Western weapons could eventually lead to Ukraine's victory.
Fifth, then to the hard slog of Bakhmut, Russia's offensive against Ukraine's critical infrastructure, and the play for more time to allow those Western weapons and training to come so that the spring counteroffensive could eventually deliver.
Sixth, the great expectation was then placed on the Spring Offensive and hope that Russian forces could collapse quickly under pressure from better motivated and trained Ukrainian troops equipped with better Western weapons.
Seventh, a brief interlude of the days around the Wagner mutiny and hope that this could also see a speedy disintegration of Russian forces in Ukraine. Ultimately, the killing of Prigozhin by the vengeful Kremlin mafia boss was expected, but it is hard to say what the implications of this latest manifestation of his ruthlessness are.
Eighth, growing disappointment and a realization that given delays in securing Western arms for Ukraine, Russia was given enough time to build a formidable system of defenses in Eastern Ukraine to slow/halt the Spring Offensive. The latter has been dominant up to a few weeks ago, and perhaps a malaise set in that Ukraine could not break the land bridge in southern Ukraine, with some arguing that to prevent a long war, Ukraine had to concede ground - quite literally - in peace talks with Russia.
The criticism here seemed leveled at Ukraine and Ukrainian commanders for not doing enough to retake the initiative. The view seemed to be that Russia had retaken the advantage and could wear Ukraine down and out-wait it.
Ninth, a new phase is emerging that, with some gains, however modest, on the battlefield around Robotnye, envigorates a Ukrainian push to the strategic rail-way hub at Tokmak, which could leave the land corridor to Crimea vulnerable.
However, the current prevailing thought suggests that the counteroffensive still has time and doesn't necessarily require the complete expulsion of Russian forces from Ukraine. But by strategically positioning themselves within striking distance of the land corridor and destabilizing both it and Crimea, this could constitute a significant victory and position them favorably for the end game, whether that entails ongoing conflict or negotiations.
A noteworthy aspect of this phase is Ukraine's strategic shift towards bringing the war back home to Mother Russia itself. It's trying to push back on the idea that time is on Russia's side, and Ukraine is demonstrating that it can make life very difficult for Russia, Russians, and Putin.
And, with attacks in Crimea, the land corridor and the Kerch bridge, and Russian shipping in the Black Sea coming under attack - the clear message is that while the invasion was partially sold as an effort to improve Russian security, it has made Crimea and Russia less secure for Russian forces/citizens. And it will only get worse as long as this invasion continues.
The tenth phase remains uncertain. The conflict has three potential outcomes: a stalemate, a victory for Ukraine, or a victory for Russia. Currently, a successful advance by Ukrainian forces in the southern region could either lead to a significant escalation of the conflict or potentially bring it to an end.
Let us hope and pray that this war concludes sooner rather than later, paving the way for the next phase: Ukraine's recovery and the nation's reconstruction.
First, from the early days, the narrative appeared to be around the idea that a Russian victory was inevitable within days/weeks.
Second, months in, and the realization that the plucky Ukrainian defenders could resist for some time but were still ultimately vulnerable/doomed to defeat as Putin went through the gears and was prepared to cross red lines (Weapons of Mass Destruction - WMDs). The idea was still that he wanted Ukraine more than the West and was prepared to win the escalation battle.
Third, to a realization, or relief, that Putin had limits and was not prepared to use means that ultimately would get him into a direct fight with NATO or annoy the Chinese, with WMD, etc. The realization was that Putin had limits and that the West could push him by going through the gears of supplying ever more sophisticated military weapons without the risk of escalation to NATO.
Fourth, the period last autumn when Ukraine achieved major counteroffensive victories in Khakhiv and Kherson and the realization then that Western weapons could eventually lead to Ukraine's victory.
Fifth, then to the hard slog of Bakhmut, Russia's offensive against Ukraine's critical infrastructure, and the play for more time to allow those Western weapons and training to come so that the spring counteroffensive could eventually deliver.
Sixth, the great expectation was then placed on the Spring Offensive and hope that Russian forces could collapse quickly under pressure from better motivated and trained Ukrainian troops equipped with better Western weapons.
Seventh, a brief interlude of the days around the Wagner mutiny and hope that this could also see a speedy disintegration of Russian forces in Ukraine. Ultimately, the killing of Prigozhin by the vengeful Kremlin mafia boss was expected, but it is hard to say what the implications of this latest manifestation of his ruthlessness are.
Eighth, growing disappointment and a realization that given delays in securing Western arms for Ukraine, Russia was given enough time to build a formidable system of defenses in Eastern Ukraine to slow/halt the Spring Offensive. The latter has been dominant up to a few weeks ago, and perhaps a malaise set in that Ukraine could not break the land bridge in southern Ukraine, with some arguing that to prevent a long war, Ukraine had to concede ground - quite literally - in peace talks with Russia.
The criticism here seemed leveled at Ukraine and Ukrainian commanders for not doing enough to retake the initiative. The view seemed to be that Russia had retaken the advantage and could wear Ukraine down and out-wait it.
Ninth, a new phase is emerging that, with some gains, however modest, on the battlefield around Robotnye, envigorates a Ukrainian push to the strategic rail-way hub at Tokmak, which could leave the land corridor to Crimea vulnerable.
However, the current prevailing thought suggests that the counteroffensive still has time and doesn't necessarily require the complete expulsion of Russian forces from Ukraine. But by strategically positioning themselves within striking distance of the land corridor and destabilizing both it and Crimea, this could constitute a significant victory and position them favorably for the end game, whether that entails ongoing conflict or negotiations.
A noteworthy aspect of this phase is Ukraine's strategic shift towards bringing the war back home to Mother Russia itself. It's trying to push back on the idea that time is on Russia's side, and Ukraine is demonstrating that it can make life very difficult for Russia, Russians, and Putin.
And, with attacks in Crimea, the land corridor and the Kerch bridge, and Russian shipping in the Black Sea coming under attack - the clear message is that while the invasion was partially sold as an effort to improve Russian security, it has made Crimea and Russia less secure for Russian forces/citizens. And it will only get worse as long as this invasion continues.
The tenth phase remains uncertain. The conflict has three potential outcomes: a stalemate, a victory for Ukraine, or a victory for Russia. Currently, a successful advance by Ukrainian forces in the southern region could either lead to a significant escalation of the conflict or potentially bring it to an end.
Let us hope and pray that this war concludes sooner rather than later, paving the way for the next phase: Ukraine's recovery and the nation's reconstruction.
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